Verification Of Generated Key Pair Failed

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Certificate Services is one foundation for the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that provides the means for safeguarding and authenticating information. The relationship between a certificate holder, the certificate holder's identity, and the certificate holder's public key is a critical portion of PKI. This infrastructure is made up of the following parts:

Generating, Signing and Verifying Digital Signature. Ask Question Asked 3 years. 1.Create private/public key pair. Openssl genrsa -out private.pem 1024 2. Extracting Public key. The simplest solution is to use openssl dgst for both the creation and verification of the signature. Replace your steps 3 and 4. May 06, 2016 Failed Verification of Client Public Key. Use the following procedure to import an SSH key pair. To import an SSH key pair: From the main window. Follow the on-screen prompts to complete the wizard. This Step requires setting the client public key verification step as a higher priority for the login process through WSFTP Professional. Host key verification failed. “Host key verification failed” means that the host key of the remote host was changed since you ssh to it in last time and so the system does not allow access for security purposes. So you need to change the host key in the knownhosts file. How to fix 'Host key verification failed.' Posted by 4 years ago. Host key verification failed. Save hide report. This thread is archived. New comments cannot be posted and votes cannot be cast. 2 points 4 years ago.

The Public/Private Key Pair

PKI requires the use of public/private key pairs. The mathematics of public/private key pairs is beyond the scope of this documentation, but it is important to note the functional relationship between a public and a private key. PKI cryptographic algorithms use the public key of the receiver of an encrypted message to encrypt data, and the related private key and only the related private key to decrypt the encrypted message.

Similarly, a digital signature of the content, described in greater detail below, is created with the signer's private key. The corresponding public key, which is available to everyone, is used to verify this signature. The secrecy of the private key must be maintained because the framework falls apart after the private key is compromised.

Given enough time and resources, a public/private key pair can be compromised, that is, the private key can be discovered. The longer the key, the more difficult it is to use brute force to discover the private key. In practice, sufficiently strong keys can be used to make it unfeasible to determine the private key in a timely manner, making the Public Key Infrastructure a viable security mechanism.

A private key can be stored, in protected format, on a disk, in which case it can only be used with that specific computer unless it is physically moved to another computer. An alternative is to have a key on a smart card that can be used on a different computer provided it has a smart card reader and supporting software.

The public key, but not the private key, of the subject of a digital certificate is included as part of the certificate request. (Hence, a public/private key pair must exist before making the certificate request.) That public key becomes part of the issued certificate.

The Certificate Request

Before a certificate is issued, a certificate request must be generated. This request applies to one entity, for example, an end-user, a computer, or an application. For discussion, assume that the entity is yourself. Details of your identity are included in the certificate request. After the request is generated, it is submitted to a certification authority (CA). The CA then uses your identity information to determine whether the request meets the CA's criteria for issuing a certificate. If the CA approves the request, it issues a certificate to you, as the entity named in the request.

The Certification Authority

Before issuing your certificate, the CA verifies your identity. When the certificate is issued, your identity is bound to the certificate, which contains your public key. Your certificate also contains the CA's digital signature (which can be verified by anyone who receives your certificate).

Because your certificate contains the identity of the issuing CA, an interested party that trusts this CA can extend that trust to your certificate. The issuance of a certificate does not establish trust, but transfers trust. If the certificate consumer does not trust the issuing CA, it will not (or at least should not) trust your certificate.

A chain of signed certificates allows trust to be transferred to other CAs as well. This allows parties who use different CAs to still be able to trust certificates (provided there is a common CA in the chain, that is, a CA that is trusted by both parties).

The Certificate

In addition to your public key and the identity of the issuing CA, the issued certificate contains information about the purposes of your key and certificate. Furthermore, it includes the path to the CA's list of revoked certificates, and it specifies the certificate validity period (beginning and ending dates).

Assuming the certificate consumer trusts the issuing CA for your certificate, the certificate consumer must determine whether the certificate is still valid by comparing the certificate's beginning and ending dates with the current time and by checking that your certificate in not on the CA's list of revoked certificates.

The Certificate Revocation List

Assuming the certificate is being used in a valid time period and the certificate consumer trusts the issuing CA, there is one more item for the certificate consumer to check before using the certificate: the certificate revocation list (CRL). The certificate consumer checks the CA's CRL (the path to which is included as an extension in your certificate) to ensure your certificate is not on the list of certificates that have been revoked. CRLs exist because there are times when a certificate has not expired, but it can no longer be trusted. Periodically, the CA will publish an updated CRL. Certificate consumers are responsible for comparing certificates to the current CRL before considering the certificate trustworthy.

Your Public Key Used for Encryption

If a sender wants to encrypt a message before sending it to you, the sender first retrieves your certificate. After the sender determines that the CA is trusted and your certificate is valid and not revoked, the sender uses your public key (recall it is part of the certificate) with cryptographic algorithms to encrypt the plaintext message into ciphertext. When you receive the ciphertext, you use your private key to decrypt the ciphertext.

If a third party intercepts the ciphertext email message, the third party will not be able to decrypt it without access to your private key.

Note that the bulk of the activities listed here are handled by software, not directly by the user.

Your Public Key Used for Signature Verification

A digital signature is used as confirmation that a message has not been altered and as confirmation of the message sender's identity. This digital signature is dependent on your private key and the message contents. Using the message as input and your private key, cryptographic algorithms create the digital signature. The contents of the message are not changed by the signing process. A recipient can use your public key (after checking your certificate's validity, issuing CA, and revocation status) to determine whether the signature corresponds to the message contents and to determine whether the message was sent by you.

If a third party intercepts the intended message, alters it (even slightly), and forwards it and the original signature to the recipient, the recipient, upon examination of the message and signature, will be able to determine that the message is suspect. Similarly, if a third party creates a message and sends it with a bogus digital signature under the guise that it originated from you, the recipient will be able to use your public key to determine that the message and signature do not correspond to each other.

Nonrepudiation is also supported by digital signatures. If the sender of a signed message denies sending the message, the recipient can use the signature to refute that claim.

Note that the bulk of the activities listed here are also handled by software, not directly by the user.

Microsoft Certificate Services Role

Microsoft Certificate Services has the role of issuing certificates or denying requests for certificates, as directed by policy modules, which are responsible for ensuring the identity of the certificate requester. Certificate Services also provides the ability to revoke a certificate, as well as publish the CRL. Certificate Services can also centrally distribute (for example, to a directory service) issued certificates. The ability to issue, distribute, revoke, and manage certificates, along with the publication of CRLs, provides the necessary capabilities for public key infrastructure.

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The Strong Name tool (Sn.exe) helps sign assemblies with strong names. Sn.exe provides options for key management, signature generation, and signature verification.

Warning

Do not rely on strong names for security. They provide a unique identity only.

For more information on strong naming and strong-named assemblies, see Strong-Named Assemblies and How to: Sign an Assembly with a Strong Name.

The Strong Name tool is automatically installed with Visual Studio. To start the tool, use the Developer Command Prompt (or the Visual Studio Command Prompt in Windows 7). For more information, see Command Prompts.

Note Windows 7 enterprise 64 bit activation key generator.

On 64-bit computers, run the 32-bit version of Sn.exe by using the Developer Command Prompt for Visual Studio and the 64-bit version by using the Visual Studio x64 Win64 Command Prompt.

At the command prompt, type the following:

Syntax

Parameters

Option	Description
`-a identityKeyPairFile signaturePublicKeyFile`	Generates AssemblySignatureKeyAttribute data to migrate the identity key to the signature key from a file.
`-ac identityPublicKeyFile identityKeyPairContainer signaturePublicKeyFile`	Generates AssemblySignatureKeyAttribute data to migrate the identity key to the signature key from a key container.
`-c [csp]`	Sets the default cryptographic service provider (CSP) to use for strong name signing. This setting applies to the entire computer. If you do not specify a CSP name, Sn.exe clears the current setting.
`-d container`	Deletes the specified key container from the strong name CSP.
`-D assembly1 assembly2`	Verifies that two assemblies differ only by signature. This is often used as a check after an assembly has been re-signed with a different key pair.
`-e assembly outfile`	Extracts the public key from assembly and stores it in outfile.
`-h`	Displays command syntax and options for the tool.
`-i infile container`	Installs the key pair from infile in the specified key container. The key container resides in the strong name CSP.
`-k [keysize] outfile`	Generates a new RSACryptoServiceProvider key of the specified size and writes it to the specified file. Both a public and private key are written to the file. If you do not specify a key size, a 1,024-bit key is generated by default if you have the Microsoft enhanced cryptographic provider installed; otherwise, a 512-bit key is generated. The keysize parameter supports key lengths from 384 bits to 16,384 bits in increments of 8 bits if you have the Microsoft enhanced cryptographic provider installed. It supports key lengths from 384 bits to 512 bits in increments of 8 bits if you have the Microsoft base cryptographic provider installed.
`-m [y n]`	Specifies whether key containers are computer-specific, or user-specific. If you specify y, key containers are computer-specific. If you specify n, key containers are user-specific. If neither y nor n is specified, this option displays the current setting.
`-o infile [outfile]`	Extracts the public key from the infile and stores it in a .csv file. A comma separates each byte of the public key. This format is useful for hard-coding references to keys as initialized arrays in source code. If you do not specify an outfile, this option places the output on the Clipboard. Note: This option does not verify that the input is only a public key. If the `infile` contains a key pair with a private key, the private key is also extracted.
`-p infile outfile [hashalg]`	Extracts the public key from the key pair in infile and stores it in outfile, optionally using the RSA algorithm specified by hashalg. This public key can be used to delay-sign an assembly using the /delaysign+ and /keyfile options of the Assembly Linker (Al.exe). When an assembly is delay-signed, only the public key is set at compile time and space is reserved in the file for the signature to be added later, when the private key is known.
`-pc container outfile [hashalg]`	Extracts the public key from the key pair in container and stores it in outfile. If you use the hashalg option, the RSA algorithm is used to extract the public key.
`-Pb [y n]`	Specifies whether the strong-name bypass policy is enforced. If you specify y, strong names for full-trust assemblies are not validated when loaded into a full-trust AppDomain. If you specify n, strong names are validated for correctness, but not for a specific strong name. The StrongNameIdentityPermission has no effect on full-trust assemblies. You must perform your own check for a strong name match. If neither `y` nor `n` is specified, this option displays the current setting. The default is `y`. Note: On 64-bit computers, you must set this parameter in both the 32-bit and the 64-bit instances of Sn.exe.
`-q[uiet]`	Specifies quiet mode; suppresses the display of success messages.
`-R[a] assembly infile`	Re-signs a previously signed or delay-signed assembly with the key pair in infile. If -Ra is used, hashes are recomputed for all files in the assembly.
`-Rc[a] assembly container`	Re-signs a previously signed or delay-signed assembly with the key pair in container. If -Rca is used, hashes are recomputed for all files in the assembly.
`-Rh assembly`	Recomputes hashes for all files in the assembly.
`-t[p] infile`	Displays the token for the public key stored in infile. The contents of infile must be a public key previously generated from a key pair file using -p. Do not use the -t[p] option to extract the token directly from a key pair file. Sn.exe computes the token by using a hash function from the public key. To save space, the common language runtime stores public key tokens in the manifest as part of a reference to another assembly when it records a dependency to an assembly that has a strong name. The -tp option displays the public key in addition to the token. If the AssemblySignatureKeyAttribute attribute has been applied to the assembly, the token is for the identity key, and the name of the hash algorithm and the identity key is displayed. Note that this option does not verify the assembly signature and should not be used to make trust decisions. This option only displays the raw public key token data.
`-T[p] assembly`	Displays the public key token for assembly. The assembly must be the name of a file that contains an assembly manifest. Sn.exe computes the token by using a hash function from the public key. To save space, the runtime stores public key tokens in the manifest as part of a reference to another assembly when it records a dependency to an assembly that has a strong name. The -Tp option displays the public key in addition to the token. If the AssemblySignatureKeyAttribute attribute has been applied to the assembly, the token is for the identity key, and the name of the hash algorithm and the identity key is displayed. Note that this option does not verify the assembly signature and should not be used to make trust decisions. This option only displays the raw public key token data.
`-TS assembly infile`	Test-signs the signed or partially signed assembly with the key pair in infile.
`-TSc assembly container`	Test-signs the signed or partially signed assembly with the key pair in the key container container.
`-v assembly`	Verifies the strong name in assembly, where assembly is the name of a file that contains an assembly manifest.
`-vf assembly`	Verifies the strong name in assembly. Unlike the -v option, -vf forces verification even if it is disabled using the -Vr option.
`-Vk regfile.reg assembly [userlist] [infile]`	Creates a registration entries (.reg) file you can use to register the specified assembly for verification skipping. The rules for assembly naming that apply to the -Vr option apply to –Vk as well. For information about the userlist and infile options, see the –Vr option.
`-Vl`	Lists current settings for strong-name verification on this computer.
`-Vr assembly [userlist] [infile]`	Registers assembly for verification skipping. Optionally, you can specify a comma-separated list of user names the skip verification should apply to. If you specify infile, verification remains enabled, but the public key in infile is used in verification operations. You can specify assembly in the form , strongname to register all assemblies with the specified strong name. For strongname, specify the string of hexadecimal digits representing the tokenized form of the public key. See the -t and -T options to display the public key token. Caution:* Use this option only during development. Adding an assembly to the skip verification list creates a security vulnerability. A malicious assembly could use the fully specified assembly name (assembly name, version, culture, and public key token) of the assembly added to the skip verification list to fake its identity. This would allow the malicious assembly to also skip verification.
`-Vu assembly`	Unregisters assembly for verification skipping. The same rules for assembly naming that apply to -Vr apply to -Vu.
`-Vx`	Removes all verification-skipping entries.
`-?`	Displays command syntax and options for the tool.

Note

All Sn.exe options are case-sensitive and must be typed exactly as shown to be recognized by the tool.

Remarks

The -R and –Rc options are useful with assemblies that have been delay-signed. In this scenario, only the public key has been set at compile time and signing is performed later, when the private key is known.

Note

For parameters (for example, –Vr) that write to protected resources such as the registry, run SN.exe as an administrator.

The Strong Name tool assumes that public/private key pairs are generated with the AT_SIGNATURE algorithm identifier. Public/private key pairs generated with the AT_KEYEXCHANGE algorithm generate an error.

Examples

The following command creates a new, random key pair and stores it in keyPair.snk.

The following command stores the key in keyPair.snk in the container MyContainer in the strong name CSP.